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Although the nature and causes of countries’ wealth and development was the first and 
fundamental question early economists attempted to answer, centuries it is still actively researched. 
Furthermore, migration – despite being as old as humanity – is one of the highly debated topics of 
our times. The links between the two phenomena are the subject of this chapter. Early economists 
described the movements of people between locations and the processes of ‘modernization’ of the 
economy as parts of the same phenomenon. In modern general equilibrium theory, factor 
movements and growth are linked through several channels. Empirical research focuses on these 
channels and the causal relationships between migration and development. In recent decades, the 
main aspect under scrutiny has been the relationship linking development in low- and middle-
income countries to emigration towards rich and developed destinations. This chapter reviews the 
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Although migration is as old as humanity, it is one of the most hotly debated topics of our 
times. In particular, its association with economic development in origin countries has taken center 
stage in the recent academic and public debates. Very generally, migration indicates that people 
move away from their place of usual residence, within or between countries, temporarily or 
permanently and for a variety of reasons, while development indicates a stable improvement of 
living conditions. Early economists considered migration to be an inextricable part of the 
‘modernization’ process, which was the term given by them to industrialization and development; 
they thought that, as the economy, institutions and society evolve, people change their ways and 
places of living and, in doing so, generate development. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, while rapid technological changes, deep 
economic modifications and unprecedented migrations were taking place worldwide, economists 
began to search for the existence of regularities, or ‘laws’, in the movements of people. In their 
initial formulations, the ‘laws of migration’ stated that people moved towards the places they 
expected to be the most prosperous, the ‘great centers of commerce and industry’ (Ravenstein, 
1885). In modern words, individuals based their choices on expectations on future living 
conditions in different locations and, more than today, faced great uncertainty on identifying these 
centers; the wealth of nations was rapidly shifting from old to new locations, sometimes in 
unpredictable ways.  The ‘laws’ also entailed a reverse effect: by moving, people helped economies 
to transition from traditional to modern conditions. Lack of movement was the antithesis of 
development: ‘Migration means life and progress; a sedentary population stagnation’, Ravenstein 
(1885). 
Later, during the twentieth century, except for general equilibrium models evidencing the 
reciprocal associations between variables, migration and development were increasingly seen as 
distinct phenomena that could be researched separately, each taking the other as given. In 
neoclassical thinking, development was seen as a gradual convergence of low-income countries to 
the condition of a representative rich Western economy, while migration was the result of utility-
maximizing individuals who formed expectations on wage or income differentials between 
countries and were constrained by the costs of moving. In trade and factors movements models, 
migration reinforced the process of incomes’ convergence across origins and destinations. The 
separation of migration and development into independent phenomena also allowed the nexuses 
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of causality between them to be tested empirically. In later decades, this has been greatly facilitated 
by an increasing availability of standardized data on the income of countries, the movements of 
people and other variables. 
Among the several channels linking migration and development, the one between 
development in origin countries and migration to rich destinations has been reserved special 
attention. As development is a complex phenomenon, empirical research uses simpler indicators 
as proxies of it, among which the most common one is average income. Neoclassical models 
predict decreasing emigration as the income differential between home and foreign countries 
decreases, but several empirical studies have instead found that emigration tends to exhibit a hump-
shaped pattern when plotted against the average income of origin countries (Clemens, 2014). 
Opinions regarding the reasons behind this ‘migration hump’, and the possibility of considering it 
a causal relationship, differ, and the findings of econometric studies testing their robustness are 
heterogeneous. This debate especially matters because of the sensitivity of its policy implications, 
in particular regarding aid transfers from rich economies aimed to spurt development in low-
income economies, or the efficacy of purely restrictive policies on immigration. This chapter 
reviews the evolution of economic research on migration and development and focuses, in 
particular, on aspects related to the debate regarding the ‘migration hump’. In doing so, it 
necessarily omits some branches of studies that, albeit important, are less directly concerned with 
this debate. The quest for the reasons behind the ‘migration hump’ has revived inquiries that were 
at the heart of the pioneering studies on migration and ‘modernization’; hence, the chapter starts 
from them. It then reviews how economic research on these topics evolved as the real world 
changed. The last section focuses on the migration-development debate. 
 
1. Early studies 
In the works of early economists, migration and development were seen as intertwined 
concepts. Development was known as ‘modernization’, ‘progress’ or industrialization and was at 
the heart of the debate on the causes of the wealth of nations. A crucial determinant for Adam 
Smith was the division of labor, which meant that the prosperity of nations was crucially dependent 
upon capital and labor being able to move freely to the most productive locations. He made it clear 
that thriving nations were those in which the means of production were not monopolized and their 
use was not restricted and, more generally, those where the rules on the use and ownership of new 
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lands were wisely designed. In this respect, the British colonies were well-endowed: their superior 
institutions made them to flourish more than the colonies of Spain and Portugal, but such 
superiority was only able to continue if supported by the domestic and international free 
movements of workers, capital and technological knowledge (a review of developments on this 
thesis is found in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). 
David Ricardo shared the notion of free movements as the best allocation mechanism but, 
more than Smith, linked the wealth of nations to their technological advantage. The most 
prosperous nations were those open to international exchanges and those with the best productive 
knowledge. Development crucially depended on it, but knowledge was a non-tradable good: free 
international exchanges produced gains for all participants, but did not guarantee incomes’ 
convergence. This differed from some of the later neoclassical approaches that will be briefly seen 
below.  
Both economists lived in a world where, except for short distances, only a minority of 
people could freely migrate. At the end of the eighteenth and start of the nineteenth century, slavery 
and the slave trade were gradually being replaced by international recruitments of foreign workers, 
but individuals’ movements from one country to another, or even within countries, were still often 
restricted, taxed, or entirely impeded. The symmetrical and opposite situation, regarding the forced 
emigration of ethnic, political or religious minorities, was considered just another manifestation of 
the wider phenomenon of peoples’ movements. 
 
2. The technological revolution and mass migration 
The world changed in the mid-nineteenth century with the invention of the steam engine 
and the ensuing technological revolution. More so than before, prosperity was the result of a 
division of labor that was facilitated by the faster and cheaper transportation of goods, capital and 
people between distant areas, on a global scale. This led to large-scale productions and rapidly 
increasing productivity in some locations, the ‘centers of modernity’, but this trade expansion also 
revealed the comparative advantage of non-European world regions in crucial agricultural and 
mining sectors. British and, later, European cities produced and exported increasing amounts of 
manufactured goods, while at the same time vast areas of European agriculture declined as local 
crops were substituted by imports. The demographic impact of modernization was huge: improved 
living conditions increased populations’ growth rates which, together with the effects of world 
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trade, generated growing numbers of unemployed people who began to move to towns, cities and 
foreign destinations. These people found that they were not only freer to move than their 
predecessors, but that their services were also in high demand in other locations, particularly those 
in which the goods to be exported to the rest of the world were produced. While some people made 
autonomous decisions on the location to which to migrate, most followed international recruiters 
who matched supply and demand for labor from different places. Mass emigration also originated 
from parts of the world that were distant from the industrial revolution engines but that were 
experiencing the effects of cheaper transport and new trade patterns. People left some of these 
regions, particularly in Asia, due to famine and wars and moved to British and European colonies 
and to North America.    
These huge changes led economists to think that peoples’ movements could not entirely be 
explained by market forces. Migrants could not be assimilated to ‘atoms’ simply governed by 
opposing forces of attraction: they were real individuals, making decisions and choices about 
whether, when and where to migrate. Hence, migration was a phenomenon that needed to be 
studied autonomously, although consistently with the very general principles of the economic 
discipline. In 1885, Ravenstein published the first ‘laws of migration’, which stated that people 
tend to move from rural areas to towns, then to cities; and in some cases to foreign destinations; in 
general, they move towards ‘the great centers of commerce and industry’. Ravenstein (1985) 
maintained that the factors determining migration were mainly economic, but it was also clear that, 
in fact, migration choices were more complex and uncertain than other common economic 
decisions made by individuals. The migration decision implied that they had to consider different 
possible destinations, form expectations on the potential economic ‘prosperity’ of each of them as 
opposed to that at home, while at the same time pondering the costs of moving, the probabilities 
of success abroad and the chances of being able to return, either because of failure or choice. It 
was therefore a complex, uncertain and risky choice, the more so the farther and less known the 
potential destinations. For Ravenstein, like his predecessors, workers made their decisions in an 
intertemporal setting where differences in expected prosperities were more important than current 
wage differentials, to which expectations were not uniquely related. This theoretical thinking was 
rooted in real world circumstances; during the second half of the nineteenth century, income 
inequalities between countries were substantially smaller and less stable than in recent decades, 
the relative prosperities of countries or locations could change even during the migrants’ lifetime.  
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Later on, European mass migration and its drivers and effects have been often studied and 
reconsidered and from different viewpoints, but a central and recurring question is whether it has 
led to convergence in wages between origins and destinations. The question, more specifically, is 
whether migration contributed to the incomes’ convergence that took place between Europe and 
the New World from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century (Baines, 1994; Hatton and 
Williamson, 1994). In the neoclassical approach, convergence in wages is driven by the changes 
in the marginal productivity of labor at origin and destination associated with people’s movements. 
This interpretation is based on short-run trade models where one factor moves while the others are 
fixed, technologies are equal between countries and there is no technological change. During the 
era of mass migration capital has instead been found to move in parallel with labor, technologies 
differed greatly between origin and destination countries and advanced knowledge, together with 
technological progress, were located in Europe. Moreover, unlike the predictions of the 
neoclassical model, empirical studies have found that international trade does not appear to have 
substituted migration. The likely reason is that labor migrated to locations –  such as the United 
States, the Caribbean islands, vast areas of South America, Australia and British and European 
colonies – that produced goods that were exported to the migrants’ origin countries. Several studies 
find that, at that time and at least until the second world war (WWII), trade and migration moved 
in parallel (Felbermayr et al., 2015). Several of these aspects differ from those characterizing more 
recent migration movements, where technological knowledge, prosperity and capital are 
concentrated in the preferred destinations.  
One characteristic of migration that is, on the other hand, common to different historical 
times is the formation of transnational migrant networks. Whatever the initial cause of migration, 
the existence of migration ‘corridors’ between countries is extensively researched today but started 
to be noted by early economists. Cumulatively, this causes a deepening of the initial trail, which 
leads to ‘chain migration’. Another aspect of networks, directly related with development at home 
and in the destination countries, concerns the influence of migrant networks on the composition of 
the labor force, production structure, international specialization, and development perspectives of 
the destination and origin countries. Migrants from Germany, Italy, Ireland, India, China, Armenia 
and other countries contributed to carving out productive specializations in the destination areas 
in South and North America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Eurasia (Sowell, 1996). More recent and 
frequently cited is the case of skilled immigrants from India in the United States, who contributed 
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to improving the country's innovative capacity but also, through their transnational social 
networks, supported India’s technological development. 
Early economists noted that positive feedbacks with the countries of origin were generally 
stronger when migration was the result of ‘voluntary’ or labor migration. Forced emigration, such 
as that from Ireland during the first half of the nineteenth century, determined by famine, or, even 
earlier, that of the Jews and Moors from Spain in the fifteenth century, contributed to the 
development of the destination areas, but not to the development of the origin countries because, 
in those cases, the transnational network ties were weak or nonexistent.  
Migrant networks have also been found to affect bilateral trade between the origin and 
destination economies. Thanks to their knowledge of the peoples and markets of origin and 
destination economies, they lower the invisible costs of trade determined by dissimilarities 
between countries. Greif (1993) shows that during the twelfth century, the robust international 
social ties of Maghribi traders boosted trade across the Muslim Mediterranean. Who migrates and 
where, therefore, can cumulatively deepen initial comparative advantages, international economic 
exchanges and the chances of development of different world areas. Moreover, migrant networks 
can influence the economy and institutions of the country of origin through their financial and 
social remittances (on social remittances: Levitt, 1998; Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier et al., 2016; 
Constant and Zimmermann, 2016; Tuccio and Wahba, 2020). Empirical research has also found 
significant relationships between the size of diasporas and the subsequent educational levels of 
migrant flows, which will be briefly considered below. 
 
3. Mass production and the international demand and supply for labor 
 The quality of institutions and the economic prosperity of the New World main destinations 
contributed to making them attractive to immigrants (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008), but at the 
beginning of the twentieth century also made their immigration policies more restrictive. In 
particular, the United States’ more advanced level of industrialization was associated with a high 
internal and international demand for workers that, unlike before, favored people able to work in 
standardized production processes. Such workers were mostly low-skilled, but they were required 
to master some very basic levels of literacy and numeracy, particularly if they were arriving from 
abroad. One consequence of these policies was that the illiterate and unskilled people who could 
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not meet these requirements increasingly migrated to other New World destinations, where entry 
policies were less restrictive.  
 
3.1 Post-war development and migration 
With the end of WWII and the subsequent global geopolitical changes, peoples’ migration 
patterns also changed. Mass migration from northern Europe to the Americas had already greatly 
subsided before the war, while that from southern Europe gradually came to an end thereafter. On 
the other hand, people from colonies, former colonies and the remaining less developed areas of 
southern Europe moved to fill vacancies in the manufacturing, agricultural and mining sectors of 
North America, northern Europe and Australia. This happened while the adoption of mechanized 
and standardized methods of production in the destination countries was associated with an 
increased selectivity of the demand for foreign workers. The use of temporary immigration permits 
also raised, especially in relation to unskilled jobs in agriculture and the mining industries. In the 
immediate decades after the war, agreements on temporary migration were signed between 
southern and northern European economies, which were later substituted by agreements with less 
developed Mediterranean countries.  
The expansion of mass production processes and the related contraction of the demand for 
low-skilled foreign workers in rich destinations occurred at the same time as the forces pushing 
people out of low-income countries were becoming stronger. One of these was decolonization. 
With former colonial possessions, especially in Africa, becoming separate and independent 
nations, the flows of people between African countries and out of the continent increased. Part of 
the rise in numbers derived artificially from the separation of countries that formerly were part of 
a unique colony, but most of it was real. Another, and even more important, push factor was a 
generalized lack of convergence between developing and developed countries, except for very few 
south-east Asian countries during the 1980s. The oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s 
accelerated the processes of substitution of labor with capital in rich countries, and further limited 
their demand for foreign workers. These factors contributed to widening the differences between 
the prosperity levels of developing and developed countries, as well as the gap between the number 
of people who were eager to emigrate and the demand for their labor services in rich destinations.  
The stronger forces on the side of the international supply of migration and the lower and 
more selective labor demand of rich destinations coincided with a shift in the focus of policy 
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makers and scholars from the concept of ‘emigration’ to that of ‘immigration’. International 
institutions were created after the war with the aim of monitoring and providing standardized 
statistics on the movements of people and on countries’ labor markets: they are the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The allocation of tasks between them 
broadly reproduces the distinction between general, labor and refugee migration. During the Cold 
War, the United States and the Soviet Union encouraged the inflows of people from the opposing 
block and officially recognized them as refugees.  
 
3.2 Stages of development: migration and convergence 
 During the initial decades after the WWII, migration and development studies were 
interrelated and mostly took an optimistic view of the two phenomena. Neoclassical economists 
maintained that large-scale migration could contribute, through wages convergence, to rapid 
growth both in the destination country and in the origin country (Kindleberger, 1965).  
Development was conceived as a sequence of stages of structural change - production and 
employment shifted from the primary to the industrial and then to the service sector (Rostow, 
1959) - through which, sooner or later - but in the same order - every country evolved to the state 
of maturity and wealth, which was approximately that of a rich Western economy. Development 
theorists focused their attention on the manufacturing sector and its potential as the ‘engine of 
growth’ for the whole economy. It was thought that the takeoff of the industrialization process 
depended on an initial amount of extra resources and savings that could came from surpluses in 
agriculture. According to some economists, the home economy of countries where the takeoff did 
not occur spontaneously, should be protected from international competition at least until, through 
economies of scale, it reached the productivity levels needed to compete on the open markets. This 
‘infant industry’ theory helped to justify protectionist measures in the United States in the early 
twentieth century, and later, in the decades following WWII, import-substitution policies in South 
American, Asian and African countries. In those same years, workers from these countries 
emigrated to seek employment in the growing manufacturing sectors of the more developed 
economies.  
Lewis (1954) explained migration as factor movements between or within countries that 
were determined by labor supply and demand, likewise those of capital. Lee (1966) revised 
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Ravenstein ‘laws of migration’ by describing the movements of people as being driven by push 
and pull forces and impeded by obstacles or ‘costs’. People decided whether to migrate by 
considering the expected economic conditions at home and in the potential destination, and the 
intervening obstacles. He stated that ‘the balance in favor of the move must be enough to overcome 
the natural inertia which always exists’ (Lee, 1966, pg. 51). In contrast with Ravenstein, he defined 
immobility as the natural human state, and migration as the exception, but agreed that ‘[m]igration 
means life and progress; a sedentary population, stagnation’ (Lee, 1966, pg. 54). He assumed that 
the volume of migration increases with the diversity between areas; industrialization introduced 
diversity, created new opportunities and was a magnet for immigrants, and diversity between 
people was also positively related to migration. Following Roy (1951), he observed that migration 
tends to occur along well-defined streams and is selective: migrants responding to plus factors at 
the destination (who do not need to migrate) tend to be positively selected (they are more 
frequently educated people), while those responding to negative factors at home tend to be 
negatively selected; the latter include those pushed by famine and political expulsions. Lee states 
that he would like his hypotheses to be testable with empirical data, but says that migration is a 
complex phenomenon and ‘the often necessary simplifying condition – all other things being equal 
– is impossible to realize’ (Lee, 1966, pg. 57). A few years later, Harris and Todaro (1970) 
reconsidered push and pull factors at origin and destination and maintained that migration 
decisions are based not only on expected wages, but on wages weighted by the probability of being 
employed (Todaro, 1971). While these migration models differed between them in some 
assumptions, their policy implications were very similar and were akin to those of earlier theories: 
impediments to peoples’ movements within or between countries should be reduced; migration 
must be free to follow industrialization. 
 Zelinsky (1971) conjugated the economic ‘laws of migration’ of Ravenstein (1884), Lewis 
(1954), Lee (1966), Harris and Todaro (1970), with a theory of ‘demographic transition’, by which 
modernization initially lowered mortality without decreasing birth rates, thus increasing 
population growth, but this happened until the number of births also started to decrease. This initial 
population expansion generated an excess supply of workers who moved to destinations with a 
surplus demand for labor. In this way, Zelinsky introduced non-linearity into the relationship 
between modernization and migration: population and migration initially increased and later, when 
the economy reached more mature stages of development, decreased again. Hence, unlike the 
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prediction of traditional models, where emigration is expected to decrease with development, it 
was related to development in a bell-shaped fashion.  
The above migration theories have gradually been incorporated into formal models 
according to which peoples’ decisions to migrate derive from the maximization of expected utility 
functions – with their arguments being wages or income at home and abroad – subject to budget 
constraints regarding migration costs. Assumptions on preferences and costs allow these models 
to be extended to a macroeconomic framework and their predictions to be tested with 
macroeconomic data (on the evolution of migration models, see Borjas, 1987; Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1998; Massey et al., 1993; Hatton and Williamson 2005; de Haas, 2010). A recent 
strand of the literature, which will be reviewed below, is based on microeconomic data.  
The maximization of the utility functions of potential migrants is generally based on 
adaptive expectations on countries’ future incomes or wages, which uniquely depend on present 
values. This may seem a strong shift from earlier theories, where migrants were described as being 
highly uncertain as to the future prosperity of the alternative locations and were unable to base 
their expectations confidently on existing income or wage differentials. However, during the mass 
migration era, the inequalities between countries were relatively small compared to those of later 
periods, and more subject to change. From the second half of the twentieth century, income 
inequalities between countries became larger and more stable: countries belonging to each income 
and prosperity group were easily identifiable. Milanovic (2011) points out that differences between 
mean country incomes accounted for only 15 Gini points in around 1820, but more recently number 
over 50 Gini points. Hence, the simplifying assumptions of neoclassical models based on adaptive 
expectations can be considered realistic when referring to movements from developing to 
developed economies, while more fundamental uncertainty can still apply to movements between 
countries at similar levels of development.  
In parallel with neoclassical models of migration and development, but in contrast with 
their positive views on growth and convergence, ‘pessimistic’ theories on movements of people 
from the South to the North of the world have described migration as being purely functional to 
the enrichment of developed economies. From this perspective, emigration did not have any 
positive effect on the sending countries and could even produce negative consequences. 
Consistently with this view, a theory of ‘immiserizing growth’ developed by Bhagwati (1958) and 
of immiserizing investments from abroad by Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1959) claimed that as 
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low-income countries specialize in primary products and the terms of trade of these products are 
likely to decline over time, they become poorer as their production increases. This generates an 
excess supply of impoverished workers migrating to rich countries, guaranteeing a constant 
international supply of cheap labor. Despite empirical studies evidenced that the terms of trade of 
primary products do not appear to decline over time, the division of world production between 
countries was seen as generally perpetuating and deepening inequalities. Piore (1979) argued that, 
with an international dual labor market, migration stemmed from the intrinsic labor demands of 
modern industrial societies. 
  After the failure of import-substitution policies in several Latin American, African and 
Asian economies, development economists and policy makers supported exports-promotion 
measures (a review is found in Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000). In their view, exports were potential 
drivers of development and, furthermore, were also likely to curb the need to emigrate: trade theory 
predicts that exchanges of goods and international movements of factors substitute for each other. 
Exports should both stimulate growth and discourage emigration. However, less than two decades 
after the end of WWII, the richest destination markets erected high trade barriers to imports of 
agricultural products, which were the main international specialization sectors of the majority of 
developing economies. Alongside this and the oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s, mentioned above, 
many developing economies found that the foreign absorption of both their exports and their 
workers fell well below the volumes they had initially expected. 
 
4. Human capital and migrant skills 
With the technological revolution of information and communication technologies (ICT), 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the liberalization of economic exchanges between vast areas of the 
world, rich countries gradually but extensively transferred their standardized productions abroad, 
particularly to some south-east Asian economies. This led to a dramatic decrease in their demand 
for low- and especially middle-skilled manufacturing workers (Peri, 2016). On the other hand, the 
Asian countries to which the production processes were outsourced experienced job growth, higher 
wages and lower emigration. Some of them and, thereafter, some east European economies, 
became magnets of immigration.  
While the ICT technological revolution was taking place, economists’ explanations of 
development changed substantially. Rather than a predetermined and unique set of subsequent 
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stages that all countries experienced on their way to maturity, the phenomenon began to be seen 
as an array of potential dynamic paths, where those with fastest rates of human capital were 
associated with higher development levels. Human capital was knowledge, which could grow 
endogenously and did not depend on initial agricultural surpluses (one example is the south-east 
Asian four ‘tigers’) or policies of either import-substitution or export-promotion. It could be 
supported by measures that enhanced education and innovation but, in order for them to be 
effective, other conditions and circumstances also had to apply. 
Non-unique and non-deterministic development trajectories meant that developed 
economies had, in the past, not necessarily been equal to current low- or middle-income countries. 
Rapidly growing south-east Asian countries were not experiencing the same stages previously 
undertaken by mature economies. In this approach, processes of human capital accumulation are 
path-dependent: they can start by chance, proceed endogenously, and be affected by external 
circumstances, casual events, and human behavior (Romer, 1994). Unlike previous neoclassical 
optimistic theories, wealth and maturity can be achieved by some countries but not necessarily 
also by all the others; convergence in income levels is not guaranteed by the pure working of 
market forces, or, as mentioned above, by policies aiming to boost structural change. From this 
perspective, migration does not mechanically reduce income inequalities. With more similarities 
to the Ricardian view, the wealth of nations is associated with their levels of knowledge and 
innovative capacity, which are non-tradable goods. Developing countries cannot obtain them 
simply in exchange for their exports, but may improve their own technological levels with policies 
specifically aimed at improving education at home and at international transfers of knowledge 
(Nomaler et al., 2020). 
The ICT technological revolution, freer trade, and the centrality of human capital are often 
associated with the increase in income inequalities in recent decades within and between countries. 
In turn, higher disparities may have increased the incentives of people living in low-income world 
areas to migrate to rich economies. The empirical evidence shows that restrictive immigration 
policies do not deter these flows as expected; they remain strong, despite many irregular migrants 
attempting to reach the borders of rich economies know the extreme risks of the enterprise. South 
to north migration does not constitute the majority of international peoples’ movements, but it is 
the dominating phenomenon studied by researchers in recent times. Over the last thirty years, the 
policy prescriptions of early economists and of neoclassical models, stating that workers must be 
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free to emigrate to the thriving centers of production, have gradually been replaced by the study 
of measures able to curb unwanted immigration. 
One frequently asked question in this regard is whether excess south to north immigration 
could be decreased indirectly, for example, through economic development in the countries of 
origin and, therefore, the reduction of the economic disparities with the countries of destination. 
This approach, which is in line with traditional neoclassical migration models and may be 
consistent with development models based on human capital accumulation has been opposed by 
some economists on the grounds that, as in Zelinsky’s (1971) theory of the demographic transition, 
development in low-income countries can lead to more emigration. 
 
5. The ‘migration hump’  
Empirical research on the ‘migration hump’ tests the hypothesis that development 
determines emigration in a relationship that follows a bell-shaped pattern, similar to the one 
described in Zelinsky (1971). Development is often represented by income per capita, although in 
some cases other proxies are used. For example, Greenwood and McDowell (1991) use measures 
of industrialization in output and employment, (Hatton and Williamson (2005) the inverse of a 
poverty indicator, and Czaika and de Haas (2012) the Human Development Index. The empirical 
evidence shows that emigration rates from middle-income countries tend to be higher than those 
from economies with either lower or higher levels of income. The pattern that emerges by plotting 
countries’ emigration against income has been called in different ways by economists - ‘migration 
curve’ (Akerman, 1976), ‘migration transition’ (Gould, 1979), ‘migration hump’ (Martin, 1993), 
‘emigration lifecycle’ (Hatton and Williamson, 1997; Clemens 2020), ‘mobility transition’ (Dao, 
2018) – and, in some cases, it has been considered a stylized fact that involves a causal relationship, 
from income to migration. Different hypotheses have been proposed as to the possible mechanisms 
that channel it, including Zelinsky’s demographic transition (a review is found in Clemens, 2014), 
but recent research has favored the idea of a ‘financial constraint’, according to which resource-
constrained individuals living in low-income countries who plan to emigrate are able to so as 
income increases (de Haas, 2007; Clemens and Sandefur, 2015). It implicitly assumes that income 
growth exerts stronger effects in loosening financial constraints and increasing emigration than in 
improving expectations of prosperity at home and strengthening the incentives to remain. The 




5.1 Emigration and income: The financial constraint 
 Faini and Venturini (1993) produced one of the first studies proposing the resource-
constraint mechanism as a possible explanation for the ‘emigration hump’. Their results derive 
from basic regressions run on a small data sample from a few southern European countries. Due 
to the scarcity of standardized statistics on international migration, most studies at that time were 
based on small datasets. Since the early 2000s, data on migration and empirical literature on the 
emigration-income nexus or, more generally, on migration drivers, have grown rapidly. Some 
aspects of this empirical research are worthy of being considered before looking at its main 
findings.  
One aspect concerns the measurement of migration, which, in some cases, involve flows 
(annual or calculated as differences in stocks for different time periods) and, in others, absolute 
numbers or rates, expressed in levels or logarithms. Most of these studies consider gross rather 
than net migration (difference between inward and outward movements). Rates are generally 
calculated as emigration numbers (flows or stocks) divided by the population of either the country 
of origin or that of destination, during the same year or lagged in time. While measuring emigration 
in rates may leave doubts on the effective changes in volumes (which do not need to be of the same 
sign as the changes in rates), the measurement in total numbers is not fully informative if the size 
of the country (origin or destination) - in terms of population - is not controlled for. Another aspect 
concerns the use of emigration ‘aspirations’, rather than or together with realizations, which has 
become increasingly common as cross-country standardized surveys have provided data on 
people’s aspirations to emigrate (in particular, the Gallup World Pool surveys). Moreover, the 
datasets used can comprise either general migration or refugee movements (data on the latter are 
collected by the UNHCR). Research explicitly focusing on the ‘migration hump’ has mainly used 
data on general migration, although empirical studies reveal that economic factors, and specifically 
income, are often significantly correlated with refugee migration (Rotte et al. 1997; Neumayer, 
2005; Hatton, 2016; Murat, 2020). As larger and more detailed datasets have become available, 
the consideration of the specific characteristics of migrants, such as education level, gender, age 
and so on, has also grown. 
Studies can also differ in terms of the choice of origin and destination countries. Origin 
countries may be solely developing economies, all countries or, in some cases, all economies 
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except those with certain characteristics, such as small size or suffering conflict during the 
considered period. Studies excluding countries experiencing conflict during the considered period 
(Dao, 2018) implicitly assume that the hypothesis of a ‘migration transition’ should apply only to 
voluntary migration. The choice of countries can obviously affect results. Low-income countries 
are particularly important for testing the ‘migration hump’ hypothesis for reasons that will be 
reviewed below, but many of them experienced some kind of conflict during the period considered. 
Moreover, statistical data from low-income countries are often scarce. Some authors restrict the 
choice of countries to specific world regions; for example, Sub-Saharan Africa, which comprises 
several low-income countries and is therefore of particular interest (Naudé, 2010; Lucas, 2006). 
Moreover, datasets may concern dyadic migration movements from the country of origin 
to the country of destination, emigration from each country to all destinations, or immigration from 
many countries to one destination. For example, Vogler and Rotte (2000) and Telli (2014) test the 
non-linearity of the relationship between emigration and development with annual data on 
migration to just one country (Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively). The greater 
availability of data from OECD economies has favored the use of samples with dyadic data 
concerning immigration from many countries into OECD economies. On the one hand, this has 
the advantage of developed economies’ statistics being more detailed and reliable than those from 
other countries but, on the other, restricting the sample only to migration movements to developed 
economies implies a strong selection: these movements constitute less than half of world migration 
and are also likely to have specific characteristics.  
The use of high-frequency (annual) or low-frequency data (typically at five or ten-year 
intervals) also differs across studies. High-frequency data are more scarce, particularly for large 
samples, while low-frequency data are available for larger datasets, comprising more country-pairs 
and covering longer periods of time, but they typically suffer from high percentages of missing 
observations, which are mostly concentrated in the initial decades (generally the 1960s and 1970s) 
and concern especially low-income or ex-communist countries. 
Several studies that specifically test the functional relationship between emigration and 
income begin by showing that cross-country or pooled regressions generate the hump-shaped 
relationship. It tends to emerge with emigration measured in levels or logs, in total numbers or 
rates, and in stocks or flows. The choice of countries, years, migration or GDP specifications can 
affect the form of the curve, but with a sufficiently large dataset, a bell-shaped pattern does tend 
17 
 
to emerge. An exception concerns the use of asylum-seeker and refugee data; in this case, the 
relationship between emigration and income resulting from between-countries regressions can be 
negative or not significant (Newmayer, 2005; Hatton, 2016; Dreher et al. 2019; Murat, 2020). 
Another exception concerns emigration from certain world areas, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the income coefficient in cross-country tests can be negative (Lucas, 2006, 2015). 
Several studies using between-countries variations reveal a hump-shaped relationship 
between migration and income or positive income coefficients in linear specifications, but results 
become more heterogeneous when more exacting regressions are used. This is not entirely 
surprising, given the diversity of the measurements of migration and income used, but the reasons 
for the divergence appear to be related more to the samples and econometric specifications used 
than to other factors. In particular, the use of countries within-variations, either with fixed-effects 
or with first-differences, can weaken or, in some cases, reverse the initial bell-shaped relationship. 
Moreover, certain covariates appear to be especially significant, in that they affect the dependent 
variable, migration, but also its relation with income.  
The representation of income, either in linear or non-linear form also matters. A direct test 
of the ‘migration-hump’ hypothesis requires the specification of income in non-linear form, or, 
alternatively, the splitting of it into different levels, so that the signs of income coefficients can be 
tested. However, several studies on the determinants of migration that are not directly focused on 
the hump-shaped relationship, include income in linear form and will therefore be considered. In 
general, a coefficient on a variable in linear form is not decisive for relationships that are truly 
non-linear, but a negative coefficient on income is often interpreted as not supporting the hump-
shaped hypothesis, while a positive one is seen as evidence that development drives emigration.  
One frequently cited study that tests the relationship between emigration and income with 
a panel dataset is that by Mayda (2010). She uses data on yearly immigrant inflows into 14 OECD 
countries from 79 countries of origin during the 1980-1995 period. Some specifications include 
dummies for origin and destination countries, but her results on the linear income coefficient are 
inconclusive. In Pedersen at al. (2008), the dataset comprises immigration flows into 26 OECD 
destinations from 129 origins in the years 1990 and 2000. In specifications with a linear income 
variable that include destination-country fixed effects and dummies for origin-country time-
invariant factors (such as former colony or OECD border), coefficients on income are negative 
and significant, while in further regressions, where the origin countries’ average incomes are split 
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into four levels and interacted with social welfare policies in the destination, the relationship 
appears to follow an inverted-U pattern. However, the authors do not test for within-countries 
variations. De Haas (2010) provides evidence in favor of a hump in emigrant stocks at global level 
but, also in this case, tests are based on between-variations. 
Ortega and Peri (2013) use annual bilateral migration flows into 15 OECD economies from 
120 origin countries for the 1980–2006 period. In the pooled regressions, they find a positive linear 
relationship between the GDP per capita of the country of origin and emigration, but it becomes 
negative and significant in further specifications where origin-country fixed-effects are considered. 
Similarly, Ruyssen et al. (2014) find no significant impact of developing countries’ income on 
emigration. Their dataset comprises data on immigration in 19 OECD economies from 189 origin 
countries over the 1998-2007 period. They use dynamic panel specifications and fixed-effects 
controls.  
In his review of the research on the emigration-income relationship, Clemens (2014), 
suggests that many of the above and other similar empirical results may be flawed as the 
relationship between emigration and development takes place over long periods of time, lasting 
for more than a generation and generally for longer than most dataset periods. He considers several 
possible ‘drivers’ of the hump-shaped relationship between emigration and income, but 
emphasizes the centrality of the financial-constraint mechanism. He does not, however, provide a 
clear rationale for the economic behavior of resource-constrained individuals who wish to emigrate 
and can do so as the constraint becomes less binding, but limit their choices to its expected long-
run value, a long-run going well beyond their lifetimes. Expectations of this kind appear to relate 
more to the expected utilities of individuals - concerning the future relative potential ‘prosperity’ 
of countries - rather than to the financial constraint. This point is reconsidered in Clemens (2020), 
which is reviewed below. 
Several studies consider the education levels of migrants and the average education levels 
of the countries of origin and destination. At individual level, it is assumed that education can have 
a direct association with the reasons for emigrating or the impediments to it. Djajic et al. (2016) 
hypothesize that the financial constraint should be more significant for the less educated as they 
are more likely to be resource-constrained. They test the hump-shaped relationship with a sample 
comprising migration flows (given by the difference between 2000 and 1990 stocks) from 126 
developing countries to 30 OECD destinations and split the dependent variable - emigration - into 
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three different education levels, on which they run three separate sets of regressions. To attempt 
to control for omitted variables bias and simultaneity, they add dummies for world regions and 
small island countries, from which emigration can be stronger. As expected, their findings show a 
hump-shaped relationship for the low-skilled. However, when the main results are replicated with 
origin-countries’ fixed-effects, the income coefficients become smaller and less significant. Idu 
(2019) regresses the ratio of skilled/unskilled emigration and the two variables separately on per 
capita income and squared income. She uses data on migration stocks from 31 destinations and 
195 origins in the years 1990 and 2000. Controlling for fixed effects, she finds hump-shaped 
relationships in the three sets of regressions. 
Dao et al. (2018) use data on migration rates to OECD countries in the years 2000 and 
2010. They decompose education levels into two categories: college and non-college graduates 
and include the per capita income variable in linear and squared form. Unlike Djajic et al. (2016), 
they find that income has only a very limited influence on emigration of the low-skilled, and no 
influence on those with a college education. Their main finding is that a relevant fraction of the 
upward-sloping segment of the hump-shaped curve is explained by the population's skill 
composition and by what they term macroeconomic drivers, which are countries’ characteristics 
that change slowly over time. They find that per capita income and the population's skill 
composition of countries are positively correlated, but do not control for this correlation in their 
regressions.  
Without providing specific estimates, but considering the main points of the debate on the 
relationship between emigration and development, Lucas (2019) maintains that countries tend to 
differ not just in average income levels, but also in other more fundamental ways that can make 
them not comparable. Countries with different levels of income per capita cannot be interpreted as 
being a representative country at different stages of a unique development path. Hence, the 
‘migration hump’ should not be read as a causal relationship but as a mere description of 
emigration rates from essentially different countries. This recalls the change in the concept of 
development that occurred by the end of the 1980s, when the idea of fixed stages of structural 
change was replaced by the notion that countries’ wealth and development crucially depend on 
their capacity to accumulate human capital. 
Wesselbaum and Aburn (2019) use a dataset comprising migration flows from 198 origin 
countries to 16 OECD destinations over a period of time, from 1980 to 2015, longer than that of 
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previous studies, with the aim of measuring the effects of climate on migration. Using different 
specifications, they find negative and significant coefficients on total GDP. They do not test the 
coefficients on GDP per capita, which would be a better proxy for development, and do not 
consider population. However, in regressions where they include time trends or time dummies and 
origin-country fixed effects, which can control for population size and changes in time, the 
coefficients on GDP remain negative and significant. Böhme et al. (2020), test the relationships 
between emigration intentions, measured with online search keywords, and realizations. Their 
dataset is a panel of bilateral migration flows from 101 origin countries to 35 OECD destinations 
over 12 years from 2004. They include the total GDP of the origin country in linear form, add 
origin-country fixed-effects and, unlike Wesselbaum and Aburn (2019), control for population 
size. They also find negative and significant coefficients on income.  
More directly related to the ‘migration hump’ research is the work by Benček and 
Schneiderheinze (2020), who use data on migration flows from 198 countries of origin to 16 OECD 
destinations from 1980 to 2014. After reproducing the well-known initial bell-shaped relationship 
between emigration and income, they test the linear income coefficient for the subsample of 
countries lying in the ascending part of the path. Their main specifications include GDP and 
population, while in further tests they use GDP per capita. They find the coefficients on GDP and 
on GDP per capita to be positive in the pooled regressions, but negative and significant in all 
regressions in which origin-countries fixed-effects are included. They explain these results with 
the effects of time-invariant factors on migration and income. Among these, in the pooled 
regressions, they control for geography, colonial ties and language. 
According to Clemens (2020), the study by Benček and Schneiderheinze (2020), along 
with all those based on high-frequency (yearly) data, are affected by the fundamental flaw that 
they link emigration to short-run (cyclical) variations in income, which should not be relevant for 
the emigration-development relationship. He maintains that, since development is better captured 
by long-run income growth, the analysis should be based on long periods of time (as in Clemens, 
2014). In his reappraisal of the emigration-income relationship, Clemens (2020) dismisses the role 
of the financial constraint mechanism as the main determinant of the hump-shaped pattern. As 
already mentioned, a loosening of the constraint - even in the short-run – allows facilitate 
emigration. Clemens states that, if the financial constraint were really the main driver, then it 
should determine different emigration-income patterns in historical periods with substantially 
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different costs of travel, such as, for example, that of the European mass emigration and the more 
recent one. In his study, both modern and mass migrations appear to be related to origin country 
income levels with bell-shaped patterns.  
Clemens' (2020) own empirical research is based on decadal data from 1960 to 2019 on 
emigration from developing or former developing countries to the rest of the world, while a second, 
smaller sample is used to test emigration from 1850 to 1914. The main dataset, from 1960 to 2019, 
includes only countries from which data were available in 1960, restricting their number to about 
90, well below that of other studies. Moreover, it selects countries that had functioning data 
collection systems in 1960, if not on emigration (which can be inferred from immigration into 
other economies) at least on the variable of interest: per capita income (and hence income and 
population). He uses a data source that, relatively to the initial year, 1960, and in some cases up to 
1990, lacks data from several economies of Sub-Saharan Africa - especially those where 
decolonization was recent or ongoing - and, more generally, from low-income countries where 
statistics were simply not collected.  As already mentioned, by being in the upward-sloping part 
of the emigration-income path, low-income countries are of particular interest to this investigation. 
The dataset also excludes most formerly Communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, which 
are also potentially of interest due to the huge changes they experienced after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in both the economy and in people movements.  
In regressions comprising countries fixed-effects, Clemens (2020) finds positive and 
significant coefficients on the GDP per capita of low-income countries. However, in further 
regressions that also include education, demography and urbanization rates, the coefficients on 
income become negative and significant, weakening the previous results. While the initial within-
countries regressions include time-invariant factors, the second set of tests controls for variables 
that were previously omitted. The latter are the macroeconomic drivers that change slowly over 
time and that Dao et al. (2018) find to interact significantly with both migration and income, while 
the former are countries’ characteristics that do not change over time, such as those considered in 
Benček and Schneiderheinze (2020); these are also correlated with emigration and income, but can 
be omitted in between-countries regressions. Clemens runs the second set of regression with the 
purpose of decomposing the income coefficients into the main variables that influence them, which 
he finds to be demographics and education. Like Ortega and Peri (2013), Dao et al. (2018), and 
Hatton and Williamson (1994) before him, he maintains that education and population and, more 
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generally, the changes occurring in these factors during the development processes of countries, 
are the main drivers of the relationship between emigration and development. This assertion 
appears to be in line with Lucas’ (2019) observation that countries at different levels of 
development can differ in fundamental aspects.  
 
5.2 Factors related to migration and development 
The lack of conclusive empirical results on the emigration-income nexus and the weakness 
of the hypothesized financial constraint mechanism are turning the recent research towards a more 
attentive consideration of factors, other than income, that can be correlated with migration and are 
indicators of development. One representative study is that by Dao et al. (2021), which analyses 
the relationships between emigration and long-term factors such as demographics and education. 
The authors use decadal data on bilateral migration stocks, starting from 1970, from 180 origin 
countries to 120 destinations, and split emigration by education levels. Their main finding is that 
historical emigration trends were mainly driven by demographics, while income levels played a 
very limited role. Their predictions, based on simulations, are of mass future migration inflows 
into Europe, particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa. They acknowledge, however, that their model 
does not account for the issue that fertility and human capital are endogenously affected by income 
(p. 444). Moreover, they find fertility and education to be strongly correlated and state that ‘a rise 
in schooling in developing countries increases the average propensity to emigrate but also reduces 
population growth rates; as far as migrant stocks are concerned, these effects are balancing each 
other’ (p. 419).  
Among the macroeconomic drivers evidenced by Dao et al. (2018) and other authors, 
education appears to play a particularly important role. The links between education, human capital 
accumulation and development emerge from the broad theoretical and empirical literature 
mentioned above, while those between education, development and migration are the subjects of 
a rapidly growing line of research. Up to now, empirical results on the relationships between 
average education levels in the country of origin and emigration have been heterogeneous. Among 
others, Hatton and Williamson (1997) find that education levels are not significantly associated 
with European mass emigration; in Ontiveros and Verardi (2012) there is no relationship between 
education and overall (modern) emigration, but there are negative links between it and skilled 
emigration; in Clemens (2020) the relationship between education in the origin country and 
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emigration in recent decades is positive. One possible explanation for the heterogeneity of these 
results may be the double potential effects of education, partly similar to those of income: on the 
one hand, higher levels of education at home facilitate emigration - foreign economies’ migration 
and visa policies are generally less restrictive for origin countries with higher education levels, and 
job opportunities in them can be higher - but, on the other hand, they improve employment and 
wage opportunities in the modern sectors of the home economy. Furthermore, as in Ontiveros and 
Verardi (2012), education levels at home may interact with the skill-composition of migration 
flows.  
There is a vast amount of literature on inequality within and between countries which is 
also related to emigration and to the skill composition of migration flows. While, as seen above, 
in early migration models, the obstacles to the movements of people contributed to the selection 
of migrants (Roy, 1951; Lee 1966), in the more recent empirical research, different income 
distributions at home and abroad can influence the level and skill composition of migration 
(Borjas, 1987, Grogger and Hanson, 2011). In particular, higher inequality at home than abroad is 
found to facilitate the emigration of the less-educated. A further, but related, branch of literature 
concerns the ‘brain drain’, ‘brain circulation’ or ‘brain gain’ effects of peoples’ movements (a 
review is found in Dustmann et al., 2011). These studies are more focused on the effects of 
movements on the labor markets and development prospects of the origin and destination countries 
than on the opposite relationship, from development to emigration, but the connections between 
the two branches of research are clear. Furthermore, migrant social networks, mentioned above, 
have also been found to influence the skill composition of migration flows and not just their 
volumes. As they facilitate migration, extended networks can lower the education levels of 
subsequent inflows (Beine et al., 2011; Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Nyberg Sørensen et al. 
2003). 
Other branches of literature on the determinants of migration are based on samples of 
micro-level data. Although disposable income is one of the factors that potentially affects the 
migration decisions of individuals, most of this research does not expressly focus on the 
emigration-development relationship (Massey et al., 1993). In individual decisions’ models of the 
New Economics of Migration, households diversify and minimize the risks related to income 
fluctuations with the emigration of some of its members (Stark and Bloom, 1985). Some studies 
find that individual families exhibit greater tendency to emigrate as income increases (Clemens 
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and Mendola, 2020), while in others there is no effect of income (a review is found in Adhikari 
and Gentilini, 2018).   
 
Summary 
Development and human migration are among the most fascinating areas of economic 
research. The nature and causes of the wealth of nations was the initial fundamental question that 
economists attempted to answer and, centuries later, much remains to be explored. Lucas (1988) 
maintains that ‘[t]he consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply 
staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else’. 
Development implies change, including movements of people between locations. Migration has 
always existed, but it is currently a hotly debated topic among scholars, policy makers and the 
wider public. This chapter has reviewed the main aspects of economic research on development 
and migration, from theories where they are intimately intertwined, to empirical tests of their 
causal relationships. In particular, it has focused on one link that lies at the heart of the recent 
debate, the one from development to emigration.  
The question, more specifically, is whether development in low-income countries 
stimulates migration to rich economies. This chapter review of studies on this nexus shows that, 
despite the use of increasingly large datasets and more precise regression techniques, results 
remain largely inconclusive. The empirical data show that emigration rates tend to be higher in 
middle-income countries, but they do not robustly support the hypothesis of a causal relationship 
between emigration and income. Possible explanations for this lack of support can be provided by 
the theories and empirical findings of the studies reviewed. Some of the latter find that the hump-
shaped relationship between income and emigration loses its significance or takes the opposite 
sign when within-countries variations are considered. This may suggest that some factors that do 
not vary over time affect both migration and income but are omitted in the tests based on between-
variations. Other studies show that the hump-shaped relationship fades, or takes the opposite sign, 
when variables that change slowly over time - but are typically related to development and 
migration - are included in the regressions. Both sets of results indicate that countries’ development 
paths can differ enough to generate more than one relationship with emigration. Recent research 
studies, supported by growing, more reliable datasets, are attempting to identify meaningful 
patterns within these complex interactions.   
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The Covid-19 pandemic that began in March 2020 is significantly disrupting migration 
movements and research agendas. While data on the effects of the pandemic are still scarce, there 
is sufficient evidence of substantial falls in regular migration and increases in return flows. The 
volume and skill composition of these return movements and of the missing regular flows, as well 
as their links with the development perspectives of home and destination countries are forming the 
focus of recent and future research.  
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